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ABSTRACT. A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held by 
both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that 
cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. 
This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a 
rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive 
achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an 
axiological objection to our proposal that draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), 
Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive 
achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or 
are otherwise ‘trivial’. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of 
cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist 
approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. 
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1. COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
One of the most provocative and pressing topics in recent bioethics concerns human 
enhancement.1 The latest science and medicine makes it increasingly possible to improve human 
functioning along several different dimensions: physical, cognitive and (arguably) even moral.2 
On the assumption that such improvements are available, there is a pro tanto instrumental reason 
to pursue them. After all, to the extent that we are able to function more effectively by being 
enhanced, we can better achieve our adopted ends. But as critics of human enhancement 
suggest, the overall balance of reasons may nonetheless speak against human enhancement . That 
is, all things considered, it may be that we’re better off not improving certain dimensions of our 
functioning, at least in certain ways. 
 The variety of improvements to human functioning that will be of interest in what 
follows will be specifically cognitive improvements—viz., improvements in aspects of human 
intelligence, such as memory, reasoning, computation and decision making,3 as opposed to (for 
example) improvements in the affective (i.e., emotional) or conative (volitional) states or 
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dispositions. Obviously, not all kinds of cognitive improvements are controversial. Accordingly, 
bioethicists typically distinguish between the following two kinds of cognitive improvements: 
 
Therapeutic Cognitive Improvements: These are aimed at correcting a specific pathology or cognitive 
defect (e.g., treatments aimed at slowing the progression of Alzheimer’s). 
 
Cognitive Enhancements: These are (roughly) interventions that improve cognitive functioning non-
therapeutically (e.g., by ways that do not involve the repairing of a cognitive defect or dysfunction).4  
 
In the latter case, the aim of the improvement is not restoration to healthy cognitive functioning, 
but rather to (for instance) gain some kind of cognitive advantage.5  
 A further refinement is now needed, as not all attempts to gain a cognitive advantage are 
controversial.6 One very natural (and uncontroversial) way to gain a cognitive advantage relative 
to one’s normal level of cognitive functioning is through entirely traditional methods, such as 
studying.7 While traditional cognitive enhancement has a long history, it has only relatively 
recently become possible to improve human capacities in non-traditional ways—e.g., by making 
use of the latest medicine and science to improve cognitive capacities in healthy individuals, 
through such methods as nootropics or ‘smart drugs’ (e.g., Adderall, Ritalin, Provigil, 
Oxiracetan), implants (e.g., neuroprosthetics8), direct brain-computer interfaces, and genetic 
engineering.9  
 One thriving research area surrounds the matter of just what distinguishes traditional 
cognitive enhancement (such as studying) from non-traditional cognitive enhancement.10 We will 
not be engaging with this issue here.11 Rather, we want to highlight a very simple—and often 
overlooked—background assumption which is widely endorsed on both sides of debates about 
the moral permissibility of (non-traditional) cognitive enhancement. Call this the knowledge account 
of cognitive enhancement: 
 
Knowledge Account of Cognitive Enhancement (KACE): Cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation 
of the accumulation of knowledge. 
 
Explicit, and implicit, commitments to this proposal are widespread. Consider, for instance, 
Michael Hauskeller’s remark that: 
 
Cognitive enhancements are, roughly put, all interventions that, through the manipulation of the 
human brain, improve the human knowledge situation by facilitating or accelerating knowledge 
acquisition, processing, storage, application or range. (Hauskeller 2013, 117)  
 
Likewise, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008, 3)—two of the most influential 
contemporary bioethicists—describe cognitive enhancement as generative of a ‘faster increase of 
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knowledge.’ Moreover, they explicitly regard cognitive enhancement as being geared to ‘speed up 
the acquisition of knowledge.’12 (Persson & Savulescu 2008, 7)  
 Two points of clarification will be helpful here. First, ‘enhancement’ is a normative 
concept, and one that makes sense to apply only with some dimension of evaluation in mind. A 
cognitive enhancement, as such is—to a first approximation—an improvement from the point 
of view where what matters is some [to be specified] aim of cognition, and the knowledge 
account fills in this aim with ‘knowledge’. For philosophers who deny that cognition has any 
such aim at all, a presupposition of this way of thinking of cognitive enhancement will of course 
be rejected.13 However, given the thought that there are certain values or aims, such as 
knowledge, which govern the practice of cognizing14 (and structure our evaluations within this 
practice), the notion of cognitive enhancement will be tied to the matter of how such a 
governing value—or aim—is to be specified. In epistemology, at least, the matter of how to 
specify such an aim is an increasingly contested issue.15 ‘Knowledge’ is a popular position, but 
the value of knowledge (in comparison with other rival epistemic standings) has increasingly 
been called into question—a point we’ll return to. 
  Second, it’s important to note that KACE is compatible with the thought that cognitive 
enhancement can and often will involve improvements of abilities (as opposed to simply direct 
improvements to one’s knowledge states). What KACE says is that what makes an improvement 
of human ability an instance of cognitive enhancement (as opposed to, say, moral enhancement) is 
that the agent becomes (via the improvement) better situated with respect to the aim of acquiring 
knowledge.  
 
 
2. CONTRA THE KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 
 
KACE is initially very plausible. Compare, for instance, KACE with a much weaker (and less 
plausible) account of cognitive enhancement in terms of true belief:  
 
True Belief Account of Cognitive Enhancement (TBCE): Cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation 
of the accumulation of true belief. 
 
To make concrete just why TBCE runs in to problems, just consider the following ‘meta-
incoherence’-style case, where (in short) one gets, thanks to an implant, reliably true beliefs, 
though the agent has no conception of the source of the reliability: 
 
Chip: Chip has (unbeknownst to him) undergone an experimental procedure in which a complex 
computer chip has been implanted in the parietal lobe of his cerebral cortex. Whenever Chip 
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considers which direction he is currently facing, he compulsively forms a correct belief. Whilst 
Chip’s directional orientation beliefs are invariably correct he has no idea why.16  
 
After the procedure, Chip acquires more true beliefs about his current directional orientation 
than he would have had without the implant. However, Chip’s ‘guaranteed-true’ directional 
beliefs are epistemically defective in an important respect.17 This is that there is a lack of 
coherence between, as Jonathan Kvanvig (2003, 454) has put it, ‘the understanding [Chip] has of 
the reliability of various ways of forming and holding [the relevant] beliefs and how the beliefs are 
formed in these cases.’ In short, Chip is epistemically better off than he was before, but not 
nearly as well off as he could be—i.e., not as well off as he would be had this incoherence been 
overcome. 
 To bring into focus exactly why the case of Chip can be converted into a problem for 
TBCE, just contrast the case of Chip with a parallel case of Chip* for whom we stipulate that the 
implant results in equally reliable directional-orientation beliefs though (thanks to more nuanced 
integration) with no residual meta-incoherence.18 On a continuum of cognitive enhancement, 
Chip* is surely further along the continuum in the direction of the cognitive ideal than Chip. But 
TBCE lacks the resources to explain why this could ever be so, as both Chip* and Chip, thanks to 
their respective implanted chips, accumulate the same gain in true beliefs relative to their normal 
(healthy) baseline.  
 KACE by contrast has an elegant explanation for why Chip* is further along the cognitive 
enhancement continuum than Chip. The reasoning is simple. First, cognitive enhancement 
(according to KACE) aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of knowledge. Second, given that 
the reliability at play in meta-incoherence cases (like the case of Chip) is widely regarded as 
insufficient to support knowledge,19 Chip*’s implant better achieves this aim—viz., the aim of 
facilitating the accumulation of knowledge—than does Chip’s.20  
 Though KACE looks very plausible in comparison with TBCE, we want to suggest now 
that KACE is ultimately unsatisfactory as a thesis about cognitive enhancement. To this end it will 
be helpful to consider a different sort of case. 
 
Lestrade: Lestrade, a normal healthy adult improves (through, say, genetic enhancement) certain 
cognitive abilities that enable him to much better than previously (e.g., at normal levels of 
functioning) grasp explanatory connections within a given body of information. Lestrade is 
assisting the police with a murder investigation and is given a list of 10 facts about the crime 
scene, and a list of three leading suspects (Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. Z). He easily (and correctly) 
works out very quickly that Mr. X must be the murderer. Prior to the cognitive enhancement, 
Lestrade would not have been able to work this out (at least not without great difficulty 
anyway).21  
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According to KACE, the genetic modification underwent by Lestrade is an instance of cognitive 
enhancement in virtue of better situating Lestrade with respect to the aim of knowledge 
acquisition. That Lestrade comes to know something via this cognitive enhancement that he 
wouldn’t have otherwise known thus accords with KACE. What we want to draw attention to, 
however, is that Lestrade’s enhanced abilities also facilitate his ability to gain a different kind of 
epistemic standing. This is understanding-why—i.e., the state that one attains when one understands 
why something is the case (e.g., why the television isn’t working).  
 For ease of expression, we will talk of understanding-why and understanding 
interchangeably. Note, however, that in the contemporary literature the former is regarded as a 
sub-species of the latter, in that there are other kinds of understanding, such as what is known as 
holistic understanding (as when one understand a subject matter, like quantum physics) that have 
different properties. Nonetheless, understanding-why is at least treated as a paradigm kind of 
understanding, and hence this simplification ought to be harmless for our purposes.22 
Notice that, as we have described the case, Lestrade doesn’t merely know that the 
murderer must be Mr. X, but also understands why this is so, in virtue of being able to reason his 
way to this conclusion. In order to see this point, compare Lestrade with a colleague who lacks 
Lestrade’s insight into this case and who merely knows that it must be Mr. X that is the murder 
because Lestrade—recognised now as the expert in such matters—has testified to this fact. 
Lestrade’s colleague has knowledge, but unlike Lestrade he lacks the corresponding 
understanding of why the murderer must be Mr. X. If he is asked why he thinks that it’s Mr. X, 
the best he can do is cite Lestrade’s testimony. Lestrade, in contrast, can cite the pattern of 
reasoning that led to this conclusion, and in doing so manifest his understanding of why Mr. X 
must be the murderer. Knowing that something is the case thus does not entail understanding 
why it must be case.   
 Obviously, this point is by the by—for the purposes of assessing KACE—if 
understanding why something is so just is to have a relevant piece of (propositional) knowledge 
(i.e., if understanding just is a kind of knowing, which is of course compatible with knowledge 
not entailing understanding). If so, pointing out that Lestrade’s enhancement facilitates 
understanding stands in no obvious tension with KACE. And indeed, the thesis that 
understanding-why is just a matter of having a certain kind of knowledge—typically, knowing 
the relevant causes of the event in question—has had a number of influential takers, especially at 
the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of science.23 
 However, the tide has been turning against such reductive ‘knowledge’ accounts of 
understanding.24 The problem with these proposals is that they are unable to capture the 
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particular manner in which an agent can have understanding while lacking the corresponding 
knowledge. The issue here concerns epistemic luck, and a crucial distinction between two kinds 
of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. In general, it is widely agreed that knowledge 
excludes high levels of veritic epistemic luck, where this means that when one knows, one could not 
(by forming a belief on the same basis) easily be wrong. This is often given a modal spin and 
characterised as the thesis that knowledge demands safety, where this means that one’s belief-
forming method would not have easily resulted in error in close possible worlds. 25 The language 
of ‘safety’ is instructive—what we want from a theory of knowledge is an account that avoids 
high levels of epistemic risk, and any belief that is unsafe in this sense would be epistemically very 
risky indeed.26  
 Crucially, however, veritic epistemic luck comes in two forms: intervening epistemic luck and 
environmental epistemic luck.27 The former is the standard kind of knowledge-undermining luck at 
issue in typical Gettier-style cases, as when one believes that there is a sheep in the field because 
one is looking at a sheep-shaped object (which, unbeknownst to one, is hiding the genuine sheep 
in the field behind). The latter is less common. It concerns cases where there is none of the 
disconnect between belief and fact that one finds in standard Gettier-style cases, but where, 
nonetheless, there is some feature of the environment that ensures that the belief is unsafe 
regardless (and hence that the level of epistemic risk is unduly high). Barn façade cases are an 
obvious case in point. After all, one really does see a genuine barn in such scenarios, in 
conditions which are generally optimal for barn-perception. And yet, intuitively, one does not 
know in such cases because one is in an environment which has features (on account of the 
widespread barn facades) that ensures that the true belief, so formed, is unsafe.  
 This distinction is important to the debate about knowledge and understanding because 
only the former is incompatible with both kinds of epistemic luck. Understanding-why, in 
contrast, while incompatible with intervening epistemic luck, is entirely compatible with 
environmental epistemic luck. One can illustrate this point by comparing the following two 
cases, where the first involves intervening epistemic luck and the second environmental 
epistemic luck: 
 
Alexander 
Alexander comes home to find his house in flames. He approaches someone who looks as if she 
is the fire officer in charge and asks her what the reason for the fire is. He is told by this person 
that the reason why his house is burning down is faulty wiring, and this coheres with his wider 
set of beliefs (e.g., about how faulty wiring can cause a house fire). The person Alexander is 
speaking to, however, is not in fact a fire officer at all but instead someone who is merely dressed 
in a fire officer’s uniform and who is on her way to a fancy dress party. Even so, what she said to 
Alexander was true: faulty wiring was the cause of this fire.  
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Ethan 
Ethan comes home to find his house in flames. He approaches someone who looks as if she is 
the fire officer in charge and asks her what the reason for the fire is. He is told by this person 
that the reason why his house is burning down is faulty wiring, and this coheres with his wider 
set of beliefs (e.g., about how faulty wiring can cause a house fire). The person Ethan is speaking 
to is indeed the fire officer in charge of this blaze, and what she says about the cause of the fire is 
both true and appropriately epistemically grounded (i.e., the fire officer knows that this is the 
cause of the fire). Crucially, however, all the other people in the vicinity who are dressed as fire 
officers are in fact on their way to a fancy dress party and have nothing to do with the fire 
brigade. Had Ethan asked one of them what the cause of the fire was, however, then they would 
have kept this fact from him and he would have believed their testimony.28 
 
What both cases share is that the subject gains a true belief, albeit one which is unsafe—i.e., 
given how it was formed, it could very easily have been a false belief. Accordingly, insofar as 
knowledge demands safety, as is typically supposed, then neither agent gains knowledge. Notice, 
however, what is different about the two cases. Whereas Alexander gains his true belief about 
the cause of the fire from a fake fire officer who is making his response up, Ethan gains his true 
belief by talking to a genuine knowledgeable fire officer (albeit one that he wouldn’t have been 
able to distinguish from the fake fire officers in the vicinity). I doubt anyone would be inclined 
to claim that one can gain an understanding of why one’s house burned down by believing the 
word of someone who is making up his explanation, so Alexander lacks understanding-why as 
well as knowledge. But given that Ethan has a grasp of how faulty wiring could be the cause of a 
house fire, what would prevent us from crediting him with an understanding of why his house 
burned down? After all, his belief in this regard, while unsafe, is acquired from a knowledgeable 
source and coheres with his wider set of beliefs.   
 If the foregoing is correct, then it follows that agents can have understanding-why 
without the corresponding knowledge, and hence that a knowledge account of understanding is 
in trouble (i.e., the view that all understanding-why is in virtue of the possession of propositional 
knowledge). In particular, it doesn’t seem at all plausible that Ethan’s possession of 
understanding-why is in virtue of what he knows. The immediate upshot of this point, however, 
is that insofar as we follow standard practice by treating understanding as a distinctively valuable 
kind of epistemic status, then there is a standing problem for the idea that one can accommodate 
cases of cognitive enhancement via KACE.
29 In particular, it seems that there can be cases of 
cognitive enhancement which won’t be captured by KACE because the enhancement generates 
understanding-why but not the corresponding knowledge. Indeed, just imagine a version the 
Lestrade case where there is environmental epistemic luck in play. Lestrade is now unable to gain 
knowledge of the target proposition. But the cognitive enhancement involved in his heightened 
cognitive abilities is still on display, and generating understanding-why, albeit understanding-why 
which is not in virtue of his possession of knowledge.30 
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 Before moving on, though, we want to quickly note a potential line of objection. This 
proceeds by noting that, even if, as we’ve argued, understanding-why is not a matter of 
knowledge-that, so long as understanding-why is equivalent to, or grounded in, knowing-why as 
opposed to knowing that, then the foregoing discussion poses no insuperable problem for KACE. 
After all, if this were true, then it would follow that understanding-why can ultimately be 
accounted for in terms of a kind of knowledge—i.e., knowledge-why—even if not knowledge-
that.  
 The problem with this anticipated line of reasoning is that, at least according to the 
prevailing view in mainstream epistemology, knowledge-why, like other kinds of knowledge-wh 
constructions (such as knowledge-where, knowledge-what, and so on), just is a kind of 
propositional knowledge. For example, as Jason Stanley (2011) puts it, drawing from the 
standard semantics for knowledge-wh constructions (e.g., Karttunen 1977), if Diana knows why 
the park was closed, then this is in virtue of Diana knowing, of some reason r, that r is the reason 
that the park is closed. And this is just propositional knowledge. Accordingly, then, 
understanding-why stands in relation to knowledge-why in the same way that understanding-why 
stands in relation to knowledge-that. And thus the foregoing problems for KACE., remain.
31
  
  
 
3. THE COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT ACCOUNT 
OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 
 
It looks very plausible then that understanding affords one a distinctive kind of cognitive good 
that one doesn’t automatically possess in virtue of simply knowing facts. And note that this is so 
even if the accumulation of knowledge generally leaves one cognitively better off than the 
accumulation of baseless or irrational true beliefs. It follows that KACE faces serious problems. 
Thus far, our case against KACE has been negative. Let us now take a more positive tack and try 
to motivate an alternative account which is more promising.  
 To begin with, it will be worth reflecting on what the relationship is between knowledge 
and understanding-why, insofar as a knowledge account of understanding-why is rejected. We 
saw in the last section that cases of environmental epistemic luck demonstrate that one can have 
understanding-why without the relevant knowledge. It’s also worth noting—though this point 
isn’t strictly incompatible with the knowledge account of understanding-why—that one can have 
knowledge without the corresponding understanding-why. Imagine, for example, that a fire 
officer tells an 8-year-old child that the school burned down because of faulty wiring, and he 
 9 
believes the fire officer on this basis. Nonetheless, although he understands the words in play 
(and hence can form the relevant belief), he might have no real grasp of how it could be that 
faulty wiring could lead to such an event. In such a case he would know the target proposition 
while lacking the corresponding understanding-why.  
 Knowledge and understanding-why thus come apart in both directions. Moreover, when 
they do come apart, the intuition seems to be that understanding enjoys a kind of epistemic value 
that mere knowledge (in the absence of understanding) lacks. After all, it is better to not only 
know that the house burned down because of faulty wiring but also to understand why this is the 
case. Or consider cases of environmental epistemic luck where understanding-why is present but 
knowledge is lacking. Doesn’t the subject in such cases enjoy an epistemic standing which is 
distinctively valuable, even despite the lack of knowledge? 
 There is a neat explanation available of why understanding-why comes apart from 
knowledge in this fashion, and which also explains why it is distinctively valuable. This is that 
understanding is a particular kind of cognitive achievement (call this the cognitive achievement account 
of understanding).32 In order to see the attraction of this view, consider first the nature of 
achievements more generally. On the standard view of achievements in epistemology—one that 
has been articulated by (among others) Ernest Sosa (e.g., 1991; 2007; 2009; 2011; 2015), John 
Greco33 (2003; 2010; 2012), John Turri (forthcoming), Linda Zagzebeski (1996) and Pritchard 
(2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2010a; 2012)—achievements are successes that are primarily attributable or 
creditable to one’s exercise of relevant ability. So for an archer to exhibit the achievement of 
hitting the target, it’s not enough that she’s successful, as that could be down to dumb luck. 
Moreover, it’s not even enough that there is the combination of success and the manifestation of 
relevant ability, since one can always ‘Gettierize’ the relationship between the two by bringing in 
intervening luck. A skilled archer who fires her bolt at the target, but who only succeeds in 
hitting the target because a dog snatches it in mid-flight and deposits it in the bulls-eye does not 
exhibit an achievement. For while there is both success and the manifestation of the relevant 
ability on display, the former is not primarily attributable to the latter (being attributable, instead, 
to the intervention of the dog). 
 Interestingly, however, while achievements are incompatible with intervening luck, they 
are entirely compatible with environmental luck. Imagine now that the very same archer skilfully 
fires her bolt and thereby hits the target, where something very nearly intervened but didn’t (e.g., 
the dog jumps to snatch the arrow, but narrowly misses). As before, we have a success which is 
unsafe (i.e., which could so very easily have been a failure). But the environmental luck in play 
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does not prevent this success from being an achievement. After all, given that nothing did in fact 
intervene, the archer’s success is primarily attributable to her relevant abilities.  
 What goes for achievement goes for cognitive achievement too—i.e., cognitive success 
(e.g., true belief34) that is primarily attributable to the manifestation of relevant cognitive ability, 
where the notion of ‘cognitive ability’ or intellectual virtue at play here us ordinarily conceived of 
as reliable, appropriately integrated traits of one’s cognitive character (e.g., Greco 2003; 2010; 
Sosa 2007; 2011; 2015). Accordingly, cognitive achievements, a special case of achievements 
more generally, come apart from knowledge in cases of environmental epistemic luck, since 
they—unlike knowledge—can be unsafe. But one can also have cases of knowledge that don’t 
involve cognitive achievement. The kind of testimonial case that we looked at earlier, where 
someone is for the most part merely trusting the word of a reliable informant is a case in point. 
Take, for example, a notable version of such a case, introduced by Jennifer Lackey (2009), where 
one—having just arrived in a new city—asks a passerby for directions to a major landmark and 
trusts what this individual says.  For while one can plausibly gain knowledge in this fashion, one 
would hardly suppose that one’s cognitive success is primarily attributable to one’s own cognitive 
ability (as opposed to the informant’s cognitive ability), and this is so even if one’s exercise of 
cognitive abilities (e.g., sensitivity to whether the informant looks confused, drunk, etc.) plays 
some (albeit, not primary35) role in the agent’s acquiring the belief that she does. 36  
 The alert reader will see where this is all heading. If understanding is a kind of cognitive 
achievement, then it is hardly surprising that it stands in the relationship to knowledge that we 
have identified, since this is the relationship that cognitive achievements bear to knowledge. 
Moreover, thinking of understanding as a cognitive achievement also explains its distinctive 
value. After all, achievements are generally considered to be of special value. All things being 
equal, one would surely prefer a life rich in achievements than a parallel life consisting of lucky 
successes.37  
 Consider now the following proposal about cognitive enhancement: 
 
Cognitive Achievement Account of Cognitive Enhancement (CACE): cognitive enhancement aims at the 
facilitation of enhanced levels of cognitive achievement. 
 
CACE has no difficulty explaining why Lestrade exhibits cognitive enhancement even if his 
knowledge is undermined by environmental epistemic luck, since he would still be exhibiting 
understanding, which is a kind of cognitive achievement. Even better, CACE is better accords 
with the thinking behind cognitive enhancement, which is an improvement in one’s cognitive 
abilities and their role in cognitive success. What is that if not an enhancement in our levels of 
cognitive achievement? For sure, cognitive achievement often goes hand-in-hand with 
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knowledge, which is why we might naturally gloss this thought about the nature of cognitive 
enhancement along the lines of KACE. But once we are clear how knowledge and cognitive 
achievements come apart, then it also becomes clear that CACE is to be preferred as an account 
of cognitive enhancement.  
 Finally, notice that CACE has the virtue of being an inclusive account of cognitive 
enhancement. In order to see this, suppose for a moment that we had used our reflections on 
the Lestrade case in §2 to motivate an understanding account of cognitive enhancement (i.e., the view that 
cognitive enhancement is geared towards facilitating understanding rather than knowledge). In so 
doing, we would have been able to account for why Lastrade exhibits cognitive enhancement 
even in cases where environmental luck impedes knowledge. But we would also be left with a 
very restrictive account of cognitive enhancement. After all, not all cognitive achievements 
involve understanding. An operation on one’s eyes—or for that matter, any other faculty that 
has a bearing on cognition38—might well make them much more cognitively effective, such that 
one not only exhibits greater levels of cognitive success, but also greater levels of cognitive 
achievement (as these successes are primarily attributable to one’s enhanced cognitive 
performance). But there need be no suggestion that cognitive enhancement of this kind involves 
greater levels of understanding.39 
 
 
4. THE AXIOLOGICAL OBJECTION TO COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 
 
Thus far we have not registered any claim about whether or to what extent cognitive 
enhancement should be pursued. Rather, what we’ve suggested is that cognitive enhancement, as 
such, is best captured with reference to one kind of valuable epistemic standing, cognitive 
achievement, than it is with reference to another, knowledge. In this section we want to consider 
an objection, raised in various forms by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009) and John 
Harris (2011), which threatens to pose a special kind of problem for the cognitive achievement 
account of cognitive enhancement articulated in the previous section.  
 What has troubled Kass, Sandel, and Harris with some of the more radical calls for non-
traditional cognitive enhancement is the thought that (in short) there is particular value 
associated with the kind of achievements that involve the overcoming of obstacles. Accordingly, 
by aiming to remove such obstacles entirely, some of the radical non-traditional forms of 
cognitive enhancement threaten to diminish a certain valuable dimension of human life .40 Each 
of these writers has captured this point in a different way. 
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 According to Kass (2004, 5), something important is lost when cognitive enhancement 
(i.e., in the form of drugs) changes how humans function by divorcing their performance from 
effort. In particular, he suggests that the kind of ‘easy life’ that could be made possible through 
biotechnology could render what would be otherwise valuable pursuits and achievements, 
including cognitive achievements, ‘trivial.’41 Sandel likewise worries that bioenhancement, in the 
cognitive or physical domain, threatens to undermine the value of human achievement, by 
disconnecting the success in question from human agency. Consider, for instance, Sandel’s 
(2012) remarks about bionic athletes and their pharmacologically or genetically aided 
accomplishments:  
 
[…] as the role of the enhancement increases, our admiration for the achievement fades. Or 
rather, our admiration for the achievement shifts from the player to his pharmacist […] This 
suggests that our moral response to enhancement is a response to the diminished agency of the 
person whose achievement is enhanced. The more the athlete relies on drugs or genetic fixes, the 
less his performance represents his achievement. (Sandel 2012, 25-26) 
 
In a similar vein, leading bioethicist Harris, drawing from Milton’s Paradise Lost, expresses his 
concern that bioenhancement threatens the value attained by succeeding in light of our human 
and thus fallible methods, specifically, by undermining an important freedom: the ‘freedom to 
fall.’ Writing in response to Savulescu, Harris claims that “Milton’s insight is the crucial role of 
personal liberty and autonomy: that sufficiency to stand is worthless, literally morally bankrupt, 
without freedom to fall”, and goes on to argue that “our freedom to fall is ‘precious.”42 (Harris 
2011, 110) 
 Though they express their points in different ways, Kass, Sandel and Harris are 
concerned that making our cognitive lives too easy by removing the kinds of barriers to cognitive 
success that are often difficult to overcome would undermine the value of whatever 
achievements would ensue. Call this the axiological objection to cognitive enhancement. A 
somewhat simplified way of making this point can be made with reference to a computer 
simulation: suppose you are playing a strategy game that is normally difficult to beat. However, 
thanks to a ‘cheat code’, all the obstacles from the game are removed—and it is now almost 
impossible not to win. Winning the strategy game, in such a setting, is obviously a kind of 
success, and perhaps even a kind of achievement too,43 albeit a very minimal one. It doesn’t seem 
like a particularly valuable success, however. Indeed, it is hard to see why anyone would care 
about winning such a game. 
 Another way of appreciating this point will be to focus specifically cases of achievements 
with what Gwen Bradford (2013) calls ‘zero-value’ products. Consider, for instance, her 
discussion of the value of summiting a mounting:  
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[…] achievements that have inherently valueless products gain value in virtue of their difficulty. 
In mountain climbing, the state of affairs that one aims atbeing on top of a mountainis 
valuable only in the instance when it is attained in a difficult manner, keeping the other features 
the same. If we get to the top of the mountain by taking a helicopter or an escalator, it’s not 
especially valuable. So it seems that at least in these casesachievements with zero-value 
productsdifficulty is responsible for the value of the achievement. (Bradford 2013, 210, our italics) 
 
Interestingly, this way of thinking about the value of achievements, according to which difficulty 
plays an important role in accounting for their worth, is reflected in the wider philosophical 
literature, where achievements are often distinguished in terms of the extent to which they 
involve either high levels of skill or the overcoming of a significant obstacle to success.44 
 On one way of cutting up the landscape which is favoured by Bradford (2013; 2015), we 
might be inclined to regard difficulty as a necessary condition for achievements (as a kind), and not 
merely as a feature which is a difference maker for the value of achievements. While we’re 
sympathetic to this line on which difficulty is an essential feature of achievements, we also 
thinkas do Greco (2010) and Sosa (2009)that there is something distinctive about non-
difficult cases of success through ability that  distinguishes these non-difficult cases from their  
‘Gettiered’ success counterparts.45  
 Our terminological preference, which preserves the crux of Bradford’s insight that 
difficulty is an important element of valuable achievements, and which has been defended by 
one of the authors in previous work (e.g., Pritchard 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Haddock, Millar & 
Pritchard 2010, ch. 4), is to distinguish two varieties of achievement, strong and weak. A strong 
achievement is a success due to ability which is difficult, in the sense that it either demands high 
levels of skill or the overcoming of a significant obstacle to success. , By contrast a weak 
achievement demands neither, high levels of skill nor the overcoming of significant obstacles to 
success, but requires only that the success in question be because of ability .46 Raising one’s arm 
in normal circumstances—while undoubtedly a success that is primarily attributable to one’s 
relevant abilities—is merely a weak achievement on this taxonomy, since neither of these 
additional conditions obtain. Raising one’s arm when it is being held down by someone, 
however—perhaps because this person doesn’t want you to register your vote—would count as 
a strong achievement, due to the obstacle to success. Moreover, although the highly skilled might 
be able to succeed in their fields with ease—consider the sublime shot of a top-ranking tennis 
player, for example—this still counts as a strong achievement because of the high level of skill 
involved.  
 Crucially, strong achievements—and this is a point where we align with Bradford’s 
thinking—are considered more valuable than weak achievements, where the two axes along 
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which this greater value is measured is in terms of the skill involved and the obstacles that have 
been overcome. So far, then, this fits very neatly with the objection under consideration, in that 
if cognitive enhancement leads to a situation in which subjects tend to manifest, at best, only 
weak cognitive achievements, then this will have deleterious axiological implications. The crux of 
the matter, however, is whether cognitive enhancement does tend to undermine strong cognitive 
achievements in this way, as the axiological objection suggests. We want to briefly canvass three 
reasons why we should be sceptical of this claim, before offering a more detailed exploration of a 
fourth ground for scepticism in the next section. 
 The first is that often cognitive enhancement doesn’t undermine strong achievements at 
all, and hence is often very unlike the video-game cheat example that we offered above. 
Consider, for example, the case of Moddy, who uses Modafinil to increase her focus. This is a 
eugeroic (i.e., wakefulness-promoting) drug that is ordinarily proscribed for narcolepsy. While 
under the influence of the drug, Moddy is able to stay awake and concentrate a bit longer than 
she would be able to without Modafinil, and is thereby able to work out the solution to a math 
problem on which she would ordinarily have given up (out of exhaustion or lack of focus).47  
 The case of Moddy is analogous to the case of the video-game cheat code only in a very 
limited respect—viz., that the chance of the relevant success in the two cases, conditioned upon 
the non-traditional enhancement, is greater than it would be otherwise. But beyond this, there’s 
little similarity. Consider this point first in terms of Moddy’s skill. While the Modafinil was 
clearly an enabling condition for Moddy’s success, Moddy’s success is creditable to a  significant 
extent nonetheless on her mathematical abilities, without which the problem wouldn’t have been 
solved. It would be a misunderstanding to deny that skill was involved at all in Moddy’s success 
simply because Moddy’s naturally endowed skill alone was insufficient without the additional aid 
in focus and wakefulness.48  
Second, notice that the use of Modafinil in the case of Moddy doesn’t ‘remove all 
obstacles’, or for that matter even most obstacles.49 The mathematical problem is, by stipulation, a 
complex one. An unskilled mathematician, using Modafinil, would be unable to make much 
headway. So the presence of cognitive enhancement doesn’t remove the scope for exhibiting a 
strong cognitive achievement.  
 The third reason for scepticism about the axiological objection is that often cognitive 
enhancement leads not to weak cognitive achievements but rather to more sophisticated kinds of 
strong cognitive achievement. For example, if one finds doing complex mathematical puzzles 
easier due to cognitive enhancement, then one is likely to tackle harder puzzles of this kind. In 
this way, one is not prompted by the cognitive enhancement to trade strong cognitive 
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achievements for weak cognitive achievements, but rather to tackle a harder set of strong 
cognitive achievements. If anything, then, one is led to exhibit cognitive states which are more 
valuable rather than less.  
 
 
5. COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND EXTENDED COGNITION 
 
In order to appreciate our fourth basis for scepticism about the axiological objection we first 
need to make explicit a presupposition which seems to be guiding this thesis. This is that 
cognitive achievements are to be understood exclusively in terms of one’s cognitive skills that are 
internal to one’s biological self—i.e., those cognitive skills of the subject which are rooted in the 
innate biological traits of the subject, such as her perceptual or rational faculties (call these the  on-
board cognitive skills of the agent). The thinking seems to be that where those faculties are 
enhanced by external devices, such as wearable technology, then we should only evaluate the 
subject’s cognitive achievements in terms of the contribution of her on-board cognitive skills. 
Hence, where the cognitive enhancement plays a significant explanatory role in the subject’s 
cognitive success, it immediately follows that the subject is not in the market for a strong 
cognitive achievement. 
 A good example of the kind of (non-traditional) cognitive enhancement that is in mind 
here is what Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg (2006, 5) call intelligence augmentation.50 This 
includes ‘embedding the human within an augmenting “shell” such as wearable computers or 
virtual reality’ and smart environments, in which one is surrounded by ‘an “exoself” consisting of 
their files, software, webpages, bookmarks, online identities and other personal information.’ 
One very natural example of non-traditional cognitive enhancement via intelligence 
augmentation is Google Glass ‘smartglasses’ with feature an optical head mounted display 
allowing for ‘ubiquitous computing.’51 
 To use a concrete example, consider a recent case study published by Oliver Muensterer 
et al (2014) in which doctors at a children’s hospital used Google Glass for four consecutive 
weeks. In this study a daily log was kept, and activities with a potential applicability were 
identified, and performance of Google Glass was evaluated for such activities. Participants in the 
study reported that, among other things, they worked more effectively and quickly with 
information related to (previously) unfamiliar medical terms or syndromes. A related and even 
more striking example is Phillips Healthcare’s new use of Google Glass to overlay information 
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into the clinician’s field of view, in such a way as to allow doctors to continuously monitor 
patients’ vital signs during surgical procedures without ever taking their eyes off the patient.52 
 Let’s simply grant that intelligence augmentation via Google Glass can afford individuals 
capabilities which outstrip their naturally (i.e., biologically) endowed abilities. We can restate the 
reformulated axiological objection so as to target cases like these—by claiming that in a wide 
class of ‘intelligence augmented cognitive successes’, the success is credible to the technology 
more so than to the agent, in such a way that what is left is not something to which we can 
properly credit the agent. If this line of thinking is right, then a wide class of enhanced cognitive 
successes are outside the class of valuable human achievements in that they are not significantly 
attributable to the agents concerned (unlike strong cognitive achievements).  
 Interestingly, however, recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science 
offers some resources for undermining this line of argument. In short, the matter of whether a 
given intelligence augmentation device (and, more generally, a non-biological artifact) should be 
regarded as part of one’s own agency, or external to it, depends crucially on whether that item 
has been appropriately integrated within the individual’s cognitive system. So, for example, 
proponents of extended cognition—viz., the thesis that some cognitive processes can crisscross the 
boundaries of brain and world—have claimed that technology which is appropriately embedded 
within a subject’s cognitive system, such that there are systematic feedback loops at issue 
between the subject’s onboard cognition and the embedded technology, should be regarded as a 
genuine part of the subject’s cognitive system.53 Moreover epistemologists have argued that in 
cases of extended cognition, the cognitive success in play should be treated as attributable to the 
cognitive subject, and hence that the cognitive subject should be ascribed the relevant epistemic 
states (e.g., cognitive achievement, knowledge, understanding, and so on). 54 
 It would obviously take us too far afield to defend either the extended cognition 
programme or its putative epistemological ramifications here. Our key point, however, is that 
proponents of the axiological objection are effectively presupposing that cognitive enhancement 
will not go down this route, and yet that is, in fact, a highly controversial supposition in this 
context. This is yet another reason for being sceptical about the import of this objection.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We conclude that the proper way to think about the nature of cognitive enhancement is in terms 
of the facilitation of cognitive achievements rather than knowledge. Moreover, we contend that 
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concerns about the desirability of such enhancement, at least as currently articulated, are far from 
convincing. In particular, there are several grounds available for resisting the charge that 
cognitive enhancement is bound to have negative axiological consequences.55 
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NOTES 
 
1  For a helpful contemporary overview of some of contemporary arguments for and against various kinds of human 
enhancement, see Juengst & Moseley (2015). See also Savulescu et al (2011) for some influential recent essays.  
2  In the latter case, the most substantial argument on this score can be found in Persson & Savulescu (2008; 2012). 
See Harris (2011) and Carter & Gordon (2015) for criticisms. 
3  The cognitive is often contrasted with the af f ective (i.e., emotion) and the conative (i.e., volition), as separate aspects 
of the mind. The scientific study of cognition, cognitive science, is multi-disciplinary (see, e.g., Thagard 2014), and 
within cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, the question of whether there is a metaphysical ‘mark of the 
cognitive’ is itself controversial and at any rate not a point we will be taking a stand on here.  
4  For further discussion of this distinction, see Bostrom & Sandberg (2009, 312). 
5  See Boorse (1975) for a helpful discussion of the difference between disease and health. Cf., Sandel (2012, 8). 
6  For a recent overview of public attitudes towards non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement, see Fitz et al 
(2014). 
7  One live debate in this regard centres around how to conceive of normalcy. For instance, is the notion of 
normalcy relevant to distinguishing between therapeutic and non-therapeutic enhancement normalcy relative to 
what is typical of the individual in question, or rather, normalcy relative to what is statistically within a certain 
average for the individual’s (relevant) population?   
8  For example, cochlear implants. Neuroprosthetics differ from brain-computer interfaces, in that neuroprosthetics 
are meant to replace or enhance brain functionality whereas brain-computer interfaces put the brain in contact with 
an external computer.  
9  See Bostrom & Savulescu (2009) and Persson & Savulescu (2012). 
10  See Bostrom & Roache (2007, 226). 
11  As Bostrom & Savulescu (2009, 2) ask: 
“How is taking modafinil fundamentally different from imbibing a good cup of tea? How is either morally 
different from getting a full night’s sleep? Are not shoes a kind of foot enhancement, clothes an 
enhancement of our skin? A notepad, similarly, can be viewed as a memory enhancement—it being far 
from obvious how the fact that a phone number is stored in our pocket instead of our brain is supposed to 
matter once we abstract from contingent factors such as cost and convenience.” 
12  As they put it, ‘the most likely effect of cognitive enhancement by genetic or biomedical means may be to speed 
up a growth of knowledge that would otherwise have taken humanity a longer time to achieve.’ (Persson & Savulescu 
2008, 7) 
13  There are several ways one might take such a line. One might be a nihilist about cognitive norms, for reasons 
broadly akin to why some philosophers (e.g., Glüer-Pagin & Wikforss 2009) deny that belief and content are in any 
way normative. Alternatively, one might think that cognitive value is exhausted by responsible inquiry, and 
independent of the kinds of representational states that are attained. One branch of contemporary virtue 
epistemology that places a premium on responsibility is virtue responsibilism (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Battaly 2008). 
However, virtue responsibilists are free to embrace different kinds of accounts (e.g., personal worth accounts, such 
as Baehr 2011, or teleological accounts, such as Zagzebski 2006) about what makes responsible inquiry a cognitive 
good. See for example Greco & Turri (2011) for an overview. 
14  In epistemology, one popular position is that the aim of cognition is truth, a view that has been embraced under 
the description of epistemic value truth-monism. See, for example, Lynch (2009) and Sosa (2000) for defences of 
this position. A rival view, one that has been embraced by Craig (1990), Henderson (2009; 2011), Kelp (2014) and 
by proponents of the ‘knowledge-first’ approach championed by Williamson (2000), insists that  knowledge is the 
governing value around which cognitive assessments should be structured. For discussion (more generally) of how 
the identification of a primary cognitive value or aim structures the normativity of cognitive appraisals, see Alston 
(2006). 
15  For an overview of literature on this topic, see Kvanvig (2003), Pritchard & Turri (2014), Haddock, Millar & 
Pritchard (2010).  
16  This is a variation on the famous ‘TrueTemp’ case offered by Lehrer (2000). For some other biological variants 
on this case, see Beebe (2004). 
17  According to Bonjour (1980), the protagonist in such cases is ‘subjectively irrational’ in holding the target belief. 
See also Goldman (2011, §3). 
18  Suppose that Chip*’s chip is thoroughly integrated into Chip*’s parietal lobe, as well as more generally into Chip*’s 
cognitive system—in such a way that Chip*’s directional orientation beliefs are not merely reliable (as in the case of 
Chip), but also that the resultant true beliefs are beliefs for which Chip can provide rational grounds.   
19  See, for example, Bonjour (1980), Lehrer (2000), Pritchard (2010b), and Goldman (2011). 
20  The proponent of TBCE might attempt to make a rebuttal here to the effect that the right explanation for why 
Chip* is enhanced to a greater extent than Chip is that the former is better equipped to attain more true beliefs in the 
future than the latter is, owing to his greater degree of rationality or coherence. The explanation, however, merely 
forestalls the problem for TBCE. Consider that even if, ex hypothesi, Chip were to acquire the very same true beliefs 
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which Chip* acquires in the future, Chip* is in a better epistemic position. But, if TBCE were true, they would on this 
assumption be cognitively enhanced to an equal extent, which is false. For a related discussion of epistemic value in 
terms of the production of future true beliefs, see Goldman & Olsson (2009). Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
the Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy  for raising this point. 
21  Savulescu (2001, 413, 421) argues that the potential for genetic forms of cognitive enhancement is rapidly 
progressing in virtue of the development of what is known as molecular genetic studies, the aim of which is to locate and 
characterise specific genes that play a biological role in intelligence. See Plomin (1997) for some criticisms. See also 
Carter & Gordon (2013) for an overview. 
22  For more on the nature of understanding, and the various different kinds of understanding that can be 
distinguished, see Grimm (2010). 
23  See, for example, Kitcher (2002), Lipton (2004), and Strevens (2013). 
24  See Sliwa (2015) and Kelp (f orthcoming) for two recent exceptions. 
25  See, for example, Pritchard (2015a) for a recent articulation and defence of this claim. 
26  For further discussion of the notion of epistemic risk in this regard, and its relationship to the notion of risk 
more generally, see Pritchard (2015b; f orthcoming).   
27  This distinction is developed and explored in Pritchard (2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2012) and Haddock, Millar & 
Pritchard (2010, chs. 1-4). See also Pritchard & Kallestrup (2014), which re-articulates the distinction in terms of an 
epistemic twin earth argument.   
28  These cases originally appeared in Pritchard (2009b ch. 7). See also Pritchard (2009c; 2014) and Haddock, Millar 
& Pritchard (2010, ch. 4). 
29  For some examples of authors who argue for the distinctive value of understanding, see Kvanvig (2003; 2009), 
Riggs (2007), Grimm (2010), Pritchard (2009c; 2014), and Haddock, Millar & Pritchard (2010, chs. 1-4). For two 
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